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Abstract 
We use an extensive form, universal type space to provide the following 
epistemic characterization of extensive form rationalizability. Say that player 
i strongly believes event E if i is certain of E conditional on each of her
information sets consistent with E. Our main contribution is to show that
a strategy profile s is extensive form rationalizable if and only if there is
a state in which s is played and (0) everybody is rational, (1) everybody
strongly believes (0), (2) everybody strongly believes (0) & (1), (3) everybody
strongly believes (0) & (1) & (2), .... This result also allows us to provide
sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome and to 
relate extensive form rationalizability and conditional common certainty of 
rationality. 
1. Introduction
Extensive-form rationalizability (Pearce [15], Battigalli [5], [7]) attempts to cap­
ture· the implications of rationality and common certainty of rationality in ex­
tensive games, and incorporates a, powerful, yet quite natural notion of forward 
induction (see especially [5]). 
Its intuitive justification is thus similar to that leading to normal-form. rational­
izability (Pearce [15], Bernheim [9]). However, while epistemic characterizations
of the latter solution concept have been provided (e.g. Tan and Werlang [23]), no
such result exists for extensive-form rationalizability. The main purpose of this 
paper is to fill this void. 
To obtain such a characterization, one essentially needs two key ingredients: 
an epistemic model which can capture the subtleties of extensive-form reasoning, 
and an axiom system which correctly embodies the intuitive underpinnings of 
extensive-form rationalizability. 
In this paper we use an extensive form epistemic model based on Alfred Renyi's 
and Roger Myerson's conditional probability systems (see [18], [13]), developed
by Battigalli [6]. This is presented and briefly discussed in Section 2.2. Th� 
key idea here is that players may update their beliefs as the game progresses. 
Furthermore, players need to form conjectures on their opponents' future play, as 
well as on their opponents' rationality and epistemic status. A player's type is thus 
essentially an infinite hierarchy of conditional beliefs. Battigalli's model allows 
to capture these elements, while imposing a natural (and convenient) Bayesian
consistency restriction on beliefs. A key feature of this epistemic model is that 
it is universal: every "conceivable" profile of hierarchies of conditional beliefs is 
included in the model. This is especially important in order to correctly model 
the players' forward induction reasoning. Essentially, at each point in the game, a 
player who applies forward induction looks for the opponent's epistemic types and 
strategies that rationalize the observed behavior. This search is necessarily limited 
to types within the postulated epistemic model; thus, unless the latter is rich 
enough, i.e. includes every conceivable epistemic type, substantive restrictions are 
placed on the players' inferences. In this case, the forward induction principle may 
potentially lose its bite, or lead to arbitrary conclusions which crucially depend 
on the specific restrictions embodied in the postulated type space. Of course, 
one may take the point of view that, in a given situation, certain restrictions 
are actually desirable; however our goal is to provide a "neutral" analysis of the 
forward induction logic as embodied in extensive-form rationalizability. Therefore, 
we avoid extraneous restrictions on beliefs. 1 
The axiom system (see Section 3.2) incorporates two key ideas. First, the 
notion of "strong belief' plays a crucial role. Essentially, we say that a player 
strongly believes that an event E is true if she assigns ( conditi011al) probability one 
to E at every information set which is not inconsistent with E having occurred. 
The second ingredient is the best rationalization principle: that is, the idea 
that, at each point in . the game, players bestow the highest possible degree of 
strategic sophistication upon their opponents. This is the forward-induction as­
sumption discussed in Battigalli [5] and [7]. 
The main representation result, Proposition 4.4, shows that, in any given 
extensive-! orm game, a strategy profile s survives n + 1 rounds of extensive form 
rationalizability if and only if there is a state where ·s is played and all the following 
events are true 
(0) every player is rational, 
(1) every player strongly believes (0), 
(2) every player strongly believes (0) C3 (1), 
(n) every player strongly believes (0) C3 (1) €3 . . . . C3 (n-1). 
Since extensive form rationalizability is generically outcome-equivalent to back­
ward induction [7], we obtain as a corollary the following result: Consider a 
generic N-person game of perfect information where each player has at most 
(k + 1) reduced normal form strategies: in every state where the above events (0), 
(1), . . . .  , (kN) are true the players follow the backward induction path. Another 
consequence of the main result is that, in every multistage game with observ­
able actions, there can be common certainty of rationality conditional on partial 
history h if there is a profile of extensive form rationalizable strategies reach­
ing h .  Finally, Tan and Werlang's characterization of correlated rationalizability 
(iterated strict dominance) also follows from our main result as a special case. 
This paper builds on previous work independently conducted by Battigalli [6] 
and Siniscalchi [20]. Our extensive form epistemic model can be regarded as a 
generalization of the model used by Ben Porath [8] to characterize common cer­
tainty of rationality at the beginning of a perfect information game. Stalnaker 
[21] and [22] consider a related normal form model, which can also be used to 
analyze extensive form reasoning. Unlike our epistemic model, those of Ben Po-
l Furthermore, we argue that restrictions on the set of possible types should be formulated 
as transparent epistemic assumptions. To combine forward induction reasoning with other 
epistemic assumptions coherently and transparently we must use a universal epistemic model. 
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rath and Stalnaker are not universal (for more on this comparison see [6]). [22) 
puts forward a notion of "robust belief" which corresponds to our "strong belief" 
and briefly discusses the relation between robust belief in rationality and forward 
induction.2 Aumann [2], [3], [4] and Samet [19] use different epistemic models and 
provide a different set of sufficient conditions for the backward induction out.come. 
Finally, in the context of a partitional model, Asheim and Dufwemberg [1] formal­
ize the notion of "common certainty of admissibility" and thereby characterize an 
iterated deletion procedure which captures certain aspects of forward induction. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents two examples which 
illustrate the logic of extensive-form rationalizability and its connections with 
backward and forward induction, the role of epistemic types, the consequences 
of adopting ad hoc, non-universal models, and the notion of strong belief. In 
Section 3 we lay down the game-theoretic, epistemic model proper. In particular, 
Subsection 3.2 contains the construction of our extensive-form, universal type 
space. In Section 4, we define extensive form rationalizability and strong beliefs 
and we state the characterization result. As a by-product, we can provide sufficient 
epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome and relate extensive form 
rationalizability to conditional common certainty of rationality. All proofs are in 
the Appendix. 
2. Two Examples 
The following game is a variant of the well-known "Battle of the Sexes" with an 
outside option: 
2The r�lationship between Stalnaker [22] and our paper is as follows. An epistemic model a' 
la Stalnaker induces a finite, belief-closed subspace of our universal type space and his notion 
of perfect rationality is equivalent to our notion of weakly sequential rationality in games with 
generic payoffs at terminal nodes. Stalnaker shows that a strategy profile s is realized at some 
state w of any "sufficiently rich" epistemic model M where there is common certainty (at the 
outset) of perfect rationality and of the fact that every player strongly believes in rationality 
if and only if s survives two rounds of iterative weak dominance followed by arbitrarily many 
rounds of iterative strong dominance. He mentions that similar results involving more rounds 
of iterative weak dominance could be proved. Note that n rounds of iterative weak dominance 
are generically equivalent to n rounds of extensive form rationalizability (see Battigalli [7]) 
therefore such results are related to our main proposition. The key difference between Stalnaker's 
approach and ours is that he does not work with a universal model. This implies that a result 
involving n rounds of weak dominance holds for an ad hoc class of "sufficiently rich" models, so 
that there are "enough types" to be able to rationalize the observed behavior of the opponents 
at information sets consistent with k = 1, ... n - 1 rounds of iterative weak dominance. 
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1 
Out 
2,2 
In 
2 
L R 
T 3,1 O,O 
1 
B 0,0 1 ,3  
Notice that the strategy profiles ((Out, B) , R) and ((In, T) , L) are proper 
(hence sequential) equilibria of this game. The former is supported by Player 2's 
off-equilibrium-path belief that Player 1 would follow In with B. However, the 
usual forward induction argument goes, this belief is not "reasonable" because 
the strategy (In, B) is strictly dominated by (Out,*) for Player l ;  hence, if he gets 
a chance to move, Player 2 should infer that Player 1 plans to play T, not B, so 
that his best reply is to play L. But then Player 1, anticipating all this, will not 
want to exit the game at her first information node. 
The argument relies on a restriction on Player 2's beliefs (off the equilibrium 
path) concerning Player l's rationality, and on a restriction on Player l's beliefs 
about Player 2's beliefs. In order to formalize this kind of reasoning, it seems 
natural to introduce the notion of a player's epistemic type, in the spirit of John 
Harsanyi's analysis of incomplete information games. In keeping with forthcoming 
notation, we define a set of possible "states of the world" comprising an epistemic 
type and a strategy for each player (see Ben-Porath [8]). In the case of the game we 
are considering, an epistemic type for Player 2 is (modulo a technicality which we 
shall discuss momentarily) a conditional probability distribution on the opponen­
t's strategy-type pairs3, whereas an epistemic type for Player 1 should comprise 
two probability distributions on Player 2's strategy-type pairs - one represent­
ing Player l's beliefs at her first information node, and another representing her 
conjecture following her choice of In. One obvious restriction is that Player 2's 
beliefs should assign positive probability only to strategies prescribing the move 
3In multistage games with observed actions, we can assume that players have beliefs at 
every information set - even at those which they do not control. However, in most of the 
development to follow (including the main characterization result) we only assume that players 
have conjectures at each information set they own. Thus, in particular, we do not consider 
Player 2's conjecture at Player l's initial node in this game. 
4 
In at Player l's first information set. This holds also at states where Player 1 
chooses Out. In fact a state does not only represent players' strategies and actual 
beliefs at different points of the actual play, it also represents the beliefs that the 
players would hold conditional on counterfactual information sets off the actual 
play path. 
Consider for example the following strategy-type pairs (the first table refers 
to Player 1, while the second is for Player 2): 
1 
2 
3 
Pair 
((In,B) , tn) 
((In, T) , t21) 
((Out,B), t31) 
Pu P21 
0,1 0,1 
0,1 0,1 
0,1 0,1 
1 
2 
Pair 
0,1,0 
1,0,0 
We can describe states of the world compactly using the indices of the relevant 
strategy-type pairs for each player, as listed in the tables above. Consider for 
example state (1,1). Player 1 expects Player 2 to play R; she is also certain that 
Player 2 will be certain (in the subgame) that her type is indeed t11, and that she 
is playing (In,B) . Player 1 is clearly not rational and has incorrect beliefs about 
player 2 . . On the other hand Player 2 is rational, but he has incorrect beliefs about 
player 1. 
Observe that all types of Player 1 share the same beliefs over the set of strategy­
type pairs of Player 2; yet, we regard these types as different. The reason has to 
do with the technicality alluded to above: strictly speaking, a player's epistemic 
type comprises beliefs over her own strategies as well; however, our axioms will 
require t�at these beliefs be correct. Although this is not explicitly indicated in 
the preceding tables, we assume that this is indeed the case for all types listed 
above; thus, for instance, type t11 of Player 1 assigns probability 1 to the strategy 
(In, B) .4 
In a similar vein, we also implicitly assume that players are certain of their 
own type.5 
4There is another subtlety which is perhaps worth noting. Type ta1 of Player 1 is required to 
hold beliefs at her second information set, although the action Player 1 plans to take in states 
(3,j), for j = 1, 2, 3, clearly preclude it from being reached. This is a consequence of the formal 
definition of a type. Observe in particular that type t31 does not revise her beliefs about Player 
2. While this may seem plausible (after all, type ta1 's conjecture about Player 2's behavior was 
not falsified) our axioms do not impose any such restriction - although they do require that type 
ta1 assign probability zero to Player l's initial choice of "Out" if Player l's second information 
set is reached. At any rate, such beliefs play no role in our analysis. 
5 Making this assumption explicit within our framework is possible but irrelevant for our 
5 
The sequential equilibrium ((Out, B), R) corresponds to state (3,2). Player 
2, upon being reached, must conclude that Player 1 played In; in ·particular, if 
Player 2 ( counterfactually) had to move, he would believe that Player 1 follows 
In �ith B, so he would respond with R. Also, if Player 1 believes that Player 2 
would play R, she does well to choose Out. 
The key observation now is that no 'State is consistent with the forward in­
duction story. The problem is that the epistemic model considered so far is not 
rich enough; for instance, we have ruled out "conceivable" states of the world in 
which Player 1 expects Player 2 to play L. Hence, we have "forced" Player 2 to 
believe that only "irrational types" of Player 1 choose In. This being the case, it 
is not surprising that we are unable to formalize the forward-induction argument 
proposed at the beginning of this section. 
We can "solve" the problem by introducing additional strategy-type pairs, as 
follows: 
Pair Pu P21 Pair 
1 ((In,B) , t11) 0,1,0 0,1,0 P2 1 (L, t12) 0,1,0,0 2 ((In,T) , t21) 0,1,0 0,1,0 2 (R, t22) 1,0,0,0 3 ((Out,B) , t31) 0,1,0 0,1,0 
4 ((In, T) , t41) 0,0,1 0,0,1 3 (L, t32) 0,0,0,1 
The addition of types t41 and t32 makes it possible to formalize the forward­
induction argument simply by tracing the restrictions imposed by the axioms. 
First, the only states in which both players are rational are of the form (i , j) for 
i = 3, 4 and j = 1, 2, 3. Next, in states of the form (i, 1) and (i, 2) Player 2 
does not believe, upon being reached, that Player 1 is rational - although there 
is one rational strategy-type pair for Player 1 which supports Player l's initial 
choice of "In". Hence, only states (3,3) and ( 4,3) are consistent with axioms (0) 
"every player is rational" and (1) "every player strongly believes (0)". In terms 
of the forward induction argument, axiom (1) forces Player 2 to seek a rational 
explanation for Player l's observed behavior. Finally, axiom (2), "every player 
strongly believes (0) & (1)", eliminates (3,3): that is, Player 1 must expect Player 
2 to seek a rational explanation for the observed behavior - which is again precisely 
what the forward induction argument implies. Thus, only state ( 4,3) is consistent 
with axioms (0) , (1) and (2). It is easy to see that it is also consistent with the 
subsequent axioms. 
purposes. 
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This is perhaps a good place to comment on the sense in which the original 
set of types is "embedded" in the second, enlarged space. The key idea is that 
there is (i) an obvious map carrying types of one player in the "old" space to 
the �orresponding types of the same player in the "new" one, and (ii) an equally 
natural map carrying distributions· over the set of "old" types of the opponent to 
the corresponding face of the simplex of. distributions over the "new" opponent 
types. The cruciaifeature of these maps is that they commute: for instance, start 
with type t11 in the original type space, map it to the new t11, and notice that 
this type assigns the probability distribution (0,1,0) over Player 2's new types 
to Player 1 's second information set; equivalently, observe that type t11 in the 
old space assigns the distribution (0,1) over Player 2's old types to the same 
information set, which indeed maps to the distribution (0,1,0) over Player 2's new 
types. 
In an entirely similar way, one can define an embedding of any prespecified 
extensive form type space in the universal type space which we shall construct 
shortly (see Battigalli [6] for details). The key feature of the universal space is 
that every (Bayes-consistent) array of conditional beliefs about the strategies and 
epistemic. types of player j corresponds to a unique epistemic type of player i . 
Thus, one can view any pre-specified type space as a particular subset of the 
universal type space. Types in this subset will exhibit an obvious property, called 
belief -closedness: at every information set, every player's type in the subset (i) 
assigns probability one to types which lie in the subset; (ii) indeed, it assigns 
probability one to types which satisfy (i); (iii) it assigns probability one to types 
which satisfy (ii); etc. That is, at each information set there is common certainty 
that players' types belong to the subset. Clearly, this property must necessarily 
hold for types in the originally specified space, so by construction it is inherited 
by their images in the universal space; again, see Battigalli [6] for details. 
We conclude this section with an illustration of our result on backward induc­
tion in generic perfect information games. We choose an example (a variant of 
the centipede game) which also allows us to clarify the crucial notion of strong 
belief : 
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1 A 2 a 1 A 2 a 
D I.----d .----I D l.----d I.---- 8,8 
o,o . -1 ,5 4,4 3,9 
Consider the following epistemic model - equivalently, the following belief­
closed subset of the universal model we will construct shortly: 
Pair Pn P21 Pair P12 P22 
1 ( (A,D), tn ) 1,0,0,0 1,0,0,0 1 ((a,a) , ti2 ) 0,1,0,0 0,1,0,0 
2 ((A,A) , t21) i,�,0,0 1,0,0,0 2 ( (d,*), t22) 1,0,0,0 0,1,0,0 
3 ( (A,D)), tg1 ) 0,0,1,0 0,0,1,0 3 ((a,d) , tg2 ) 0,1,0,0 0,1,0,0 
4 ( (D,*), t41 ) 0,0,0,1 0,0,1,0 4 ( (d,*), t42 ) 0,0,1,0 0,1,0,0 
We continue to assume that all player types hold correct beliefs concerning 
their own strategy in a given state of the world. 
Notice that now both players' conjectures comprise a pair of probability dis­
tributions over the opponent's strategy-type pairs; however, we do not specify 
moves at information nodes which are precluded by the previous actions of their 
owner. 
Let us begin by noting that the event, "All players are rational", corresponding 
to axiom (0), characterizes the set {(i,j): i,j E {2,3,4}} .  In particular, in any 
sta:te (1 ,j), Player l's second choice is not rational if she expects Player 2 to 
choose (a,a) - (A,A) does strictly better; Player 2's strategy in any state (i, 1) is 
also irrational. 
Next, it is easy to see by inspecting the supports of the probabilities Pil and 
Pi2 that the event (1) = "All players strongly believe (O)" corresponds to {(i,j) : 
i E {3,4} ,j E {3,4}} .  Notice that Player 2's type t12 believes that Player 1 is 
rational, but since we assume that Player 2 is certain of his strategy-type, we must 
conclude that he is also certain of his own irrationality. Also, notice that we must 
rule out Player l 's type t21 : although ex-ante she attaches positive probability to 
Player 2's rationality, this probability is not l ;  also, if her second node is reached, 
by Bayesian consistency she is forced to believe with probability 1 that Player 2 
is in fact irrational. 
All told, (0) & (1) corresponds to {(i,j) : i,j E {3,4} } .  Hence, only types 
t31 and t41 of Player 1, and type t42 of Player 2 strongly believe (0) & (1). The 
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argument for t42 is subtle but important to grasp: at his second information node, 
he attaches probability 1 to the negation of (0) & (1); however, he cannot avoid 
doing this, because if (0) & (1) were true, his second node would never be reached! 
This is essentially what we mean by strong belief : it is a restriction which applies 
whenever it is not contradicted by the evidence. 
Now (0) & "(1) & (2) corresponds to {(i, 4) : i E {3,4}}; thus, applying axiom 
(3), we are left with state (4,4) only. Again, note that Player l 's type t41 qualifies 
because her second node cannot be reached if (0) & (1) & (2) is true. 
Finally, note that also (0) & (1) & (2) & (3) corresponds to state (4,4) ; again, 
t41 will satisfy Axiom ( 4), and so will t42 , again by the notion of strong belief. 
Successive iterations will not impose any additional restrictions. 
Now notice that state (4,4) yields the (unique) backward induction path, in 
accordance with our results.6 Observe also that the subset {(i,j): i,J· E {1, 2, 3}} 
is belief-closed, but does not include the "backward/ forward induction" state of 
the world. This is a further indication of the relevance of a priori restrictions on 
the epistemic types of the players. 
3. Game-Theoretic setup and Epistemic Model 
3.1. Extensive Form Games 
For simplicity we consider finite extensive games with complete (but possibly 
imperfect) information, perfect recall and no chance moves. 7 We use the following 
notation: 
• i E J, players, 
• h E Hi, information sets for player i, 
• Si E Si, pure strategies for player i, 
6In this particular game our axioms imply that, conditional on each node, the player who 
owns that node would expect the subgame perfect continuation. But this is not true in general. 
7 All the results of this section hold when the set of strategy profiles is a Polish space and 
the collection of information sets is countable. We can also use this framework to represent 
incomplete information games without a common prior by modeling Nature as an indifferent 
player who moves before the "real" players. 
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• Ui : S --t R, strategic form payoff function for player i; 
• s E S ( h), strategy profiles reaching h E LJiEI ?-ti, 
• 'Hi(si) = {h E ?-ti : 3s_i E S-i such that (si, s-i) E S(h)} collects all 
information sets owned by player i which strategy si E Si does not prevent 
from being reached. 
By perfect recall, for each player i and each information set h E 'Hi, S ( h) = 
Si(h) x S_i(h), where Si(h) and S_i(h) are the projections of S(h) on Si and S_i 
respectively. 
Our notation is consistent with the possibility that some moves are simultane­
ous and that some information sets may be owned by several players, a possibility 
which is allowed by some extensive form representations of dynamic games (e.g. 
Osborne and Rubinstein [14], Chapter 6). For example, in multistage games with 
observable actions we would have ?-ti = 1i for all players i, where 'H is the set of 
partial histories of action profiles. In this particular case each h E 1i represents a 
common observation by all the players.8 
3.2. Infinite hierarchies of conditional beliefs 
3.2.1. Conditional Probability Systems 
Consider a Polish (complete, separable, metrizable) spaceY. We interpret y E Y 
as an unobservable (and payoff irrelevant) parameter representing the conditional 
beliefs of some players' opponents. The Cartesian product S x Y is also Polish 
(of course, we consider the discrete topology on S and the product topology on 
S x Y ). For each player i, 
B(?-ti) = {B :  3h E ?-ti, B = S(h) x Y} 
is the collection of observable events concerning ( s, y) E S X Y .  Let A be the Borel 
cr-algebra on S x Y. A conditional probability system (or CPS) on (S x Y, A, ?-ti) 
is a map 
µ(·I·) : Ax B(?-ti) --t [o, 1] 
satisfying the following axioms: 
Axiom 1. For all B E  B(?-ti), µ(BIB) = 1. 
8Battigalli [6] analyzes multistage games with observed actions and incomplete information. 
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Axiom 2. For all BE B(?-li), µ(·IB) is a probability measure on (S x Y,A). 
Axiom 3. For all A E A, B, C E B(?-li), A c B c C =:} µ(AIB)µ(BIC) -
µ( AIC). 
The set of probability measures on a measure space (Z, A) is denoted by .6.(Z) ; 
the set of conditional probability systems on (S X Y, A ,  1-li) can be regarded as 
a subset of [.6. (S X Y)] ?i• (the set of mappings from 1-li to .6. ( S x Y)) and it is 
denoted by ,6.1-l•(S x Y).9 Accordingly, we often write µ= (µ (·IS (h) x Y))hE?i; E 
,6.1-l; ( S x Y). The topology on S X Y and A, the smallest sigma-algebra containing 
it, are always understood and need not be explicit in our notation. Thus we 
simply say "conditional probability system (or CPS) on (S X Y, 'Hi) .. " It is also 
understood that .6.(S X � is endowed with the topology of weak convergence of 
measures and [.6.(S X Y)] •is endowed with the product topology. Thus .6.(SxY) 
and [ .6. ( S X Y)] ?i• (by countability of 1-li) are Polish spaces. Since .6. ?i• ( S X Y) is a 
closed subset of [A ( S X Y)] ?i;, also ,6.1-l• ( S x Y) is a Polish space (endowed with the 
relative topology inherited from [.6.(S X Y)]?i'). The set X = S X Y X ,6.1-l•(S x Y) 
endowed with the product topology is also a Polish space. We interpret a point 
( s, y, µ) E X as a state specifying which actions the players would choose at 
any information set (s) , the (yet unmodeled) beliefs of i's opponents (y) and the 
conditional beliefs on (S X Y) that player i would have at each information set 
h E 1-li. 
3.2.2. Inductive Construction 
Here we generalize the inductive construction of a universal type space provided by 
Brandenburger and Dekel [10] (henceforth BD). For all i E I and all nonnegative 
integers n, 
X9=S i ' 
x;i+ 1 = xr x rr#i .6. 1-lj ( x;). 
The set of infinite hierarchies of CPSs for player i is Hi = IT�=o .6. 1-l• (Xi). An 
infinite hierarchy represents an epistemic type and is therefore typically denoted 
by ti= (µI,µ;,. .. ,µf, ... ). Note that for all n 2:: 0, Xi and .6.1-l•(XI') are Polish 
spaces. It follows that also Hi and ,6.1-l•(S X IT#i Hj) are Polish spaces. Note also 
that for all n > k 2:: O, XI' can be decomposed as follows: 
n-l 
x; = xf x II IT.6.?ii(Xj). 
l=k#i 
9The definiton of a CPS on (S, A, 1i,) is obvious. 
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Similarly, S x II#i Hi is homeomorphic to Xik x IT#i IT�k �1ij(Xj). This is 
not simply a decomposition because we need to swap coordinates. · That is, let 
H�i _ IT:=o Il#i � 1tj (X_i).. Clearly S x H�i is homeomorphi� to S x Il#i Hj 
(via coordinate permutation) and for all k 2:: 0, 
00 
S x H*. = X� x 'IIII�1tj(X�). . -i i J 
l=k#i 
The canonical homeomorphism from S x H�i to S x IT#i Hj is denoted by <p. 
3.2.3. Coherent Hierarchies 
We have not yet imposed any coherency condition relating beliefs of different 
orders. Of course, we want to assume that, conditional on every information set, 
beliefs of different orders assign the same probability to the same event. For all 
h E Hi and n = 1, 2, ... , oo let Cf(h) c Xf' denote the cylinder with base S(h) in 
Xf, that is 
n-1 Cf(h) = S(h) x II II �1tj(XJ). 
k=O#i 
Similarly, Cf'(h) = S(h) x IT#iHj. For any probability measure v on a product 
space XX Y ,  mrgxv E �(X) denotes the marginal measure on X 
Definition 3.1. An infinite hierarchy of CPSs ti = (µ!, µ; ,. . ., µf, ... ) is coherent 
if for a.11 h E Hi, n = 1, 2, . . .  , 
(3.1) 
The set of coherent hierarchies for i is denoted by Hi,c· 
Proposition 3.2. (cf BD, Proposition 1) For all i E I  there exists a. canonical 
homeomorphism fi : Hi,c -+ � 1ti ( S x Il#i Hi) such that if µi = fi (µf, µi, ... , µf, ... ) , 
then for all h E Hi, n = 1, 2, . .. , En-l c Xf-1 (measurable) 
where <p is the canonical homeomorphism from S x H�i to S x IT#i Hj. 
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Proof. The proof can be adapted from Battigalli [6] which builds on BD (see 
also Siniscalchi [20]). • 
We let fi.h denote the h-coordinate function derived from Ji, that is, if µi = 
fi(ti} then fi.h(ti) = µi(·ICi(h)) is the probability measure on S X IT#i Hj condi­
tional on Cf°(h) = S(h) X IT#i Hj .. 
3. 2.4. Common -Certainty of Coherency 
Even if i's hierarchy of CPSs, ti, is coherent, some elements of fi(ti) (i.e. some 
fi,h (ti), h E Hi) may assign positive probability to sets of incoherent hierarchies of 
some other player j. We restrict our attention to the case whereby every player i 
conditional on every Cf°(h) believes that there is common certainty of coherency. 
Player i endowed with coherent hierarchy of CPSs ti is certain of some ( mea­
surable) event EC S X IT#i Hj (concerning s and/or the other players' beliefs) 
given h E 'Hi if fi,h(ti)(E) = 1. Thus we can give the following inductive defini­
tion: for all i E I: 
HL = Hi,c, 
for all k � 2, 
Hi�c ._ {ti E Ht-;1 : 'ilh E Hi, fi.h(ti)(S x IT#i HJ.-;1) = 1}, 
Ti= nk>1 Hfc· - ' 
Proposition 3.3. (cf. BD, Proposition 2) For all i E I, the restriction of Ji = 
(fi,h)hE?-£; to Ti C Hi,c induces an homeomorphism 9i = (gi,h)hE?-£; : Ti -+ � 1-£i(S X 
IT#i Ti) (defined by 9i,h(ti)(E) = fi,h(ti)(E) for all h E Hi, ti E Ti: and measurable 
s�bsets EC S X IT#i Ti)· 
Proof. The proof can be adapted from Battigalli [6]. • 
Proposition 3.3 shows that each element ti E Ti: corresponds to an epistemic 
type in the usual sense, except that here a type ti is associated to a conditional 
probability system on (S X TI#i Tj, Hi) instead of an ordinary probability measure 
on s x n#i Tj. In particular, the tuple (S, (Ti)iEJ, (gi)iEI) can be regarded as an 
extensive form epistemic model in the sense of Ben Porath [8]. 
4. Extensive Form Rationalizability 
In this section we define and characterize extensive form rationalizability (EFR 
henceforth). EFR is an iterative deletion procedure. Our definition of EFR is very 
close to the one originally put forward by Pearce [15] and it is indeed equivalent 
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to it for every two-person game. We provide an epistemic characterization of the 
strategies surviving each step of the procedure as well as a characterization of the 
rationalizable strategies. To make our formulation simpler and more transparent 
the following notation will be convenient. A first order CPS for player i is typically 
denoted by bi, that is, Oi E f:l'H.•(S). For every type ti E 'rt. and h E 'Hi, 6i,h(ti) 
denotes the marginal of 9i,h(ti) on S. It is easy to see that c5i(ti) = (8i,h(ti))hE'H., E 
f:l 'H.i ( S). The notation .used for profiles of types is analogous to the one used for 
profiles of strategies: t ET = IliEI 'rt., t_i = T_i = rr#i Tj. 
4.1. The Iterative Deletion Procedure 
The basic building block of EFR is the notion of weak sequential rationality. This 
is a best response property which applies to plans of actions10 as well as strategies 
(see e.g. Reny [17)). We adopt the specific formalization proposed in Battigalli 
[6] (see his Definition 5.1): 
Definition 4.1. Fix a first order CPS 8 i E f:l 'H.• ( S). A strategy si E Si is a weakly 
sequential best reply to bi Hf, for every h E 'Hi(si) and every s� E Si(h) 
1. oi({si} x s_i(h)IS(h)) = 1 .  
2. 2:8_,Es_.[Ui(si, s_i) - Ui(s�, s_i)]c5i( {(si, s_i)}IS(h)) � 0 
We refer the interested reader to [6] for details on the features of this definition. 
Here we simply point out that part 1 essentially means that a rational player is 
certain of her strategy (hence of her future contingent choices) as long as she 
knows that she has not deviated from it. Given this, we can derive a. "marginal" 
first order CPS 88, on (S-i, 'Hi(si)) and we require that si be a best response to 
bsi(·IS-i(h)) at each relevant information set h E 'Hi(si)· 
Observe also that, by part 1 of the definition, a weakly sequential best reply 
to a first-order belief is unique, if it exists at all. This makes it possible to define a 
function r i : f:l 'H.• ( S) ---t Si U { 0} assigning to each c5i E f:l 'H.• ( S) the unique weakly 
sequential best reply si or the symbol 0, as the case may be. Also, for every type 
ti E Ti, we let Pi(ti) = ri(8i(ti)) denote the "best reply" to the first order beliefs 
of type ti . 
10Intuitively, a plan of action for player i is silent about which �ctions would be taken by i if i 
did not follow that plan. Formally, a plan of action is a class of realization-equivalent strategies. 
In generic extensive games, a plan of action is a strategy of the reduced normal form. 
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We are now ready to define the solution procedure called "extensive form 
rationalizability." 
Definition 4.2. Let S0 = S. Assume that S1 , ... , sn have been defined. Then 
s = (si)iEI E sn+l if and only ifs E sn and, for each player i, there exist� some 
8f E D,. 'H.i ( S) such that: 
For every player i and positive integer n, denote by Si the projection of sn 
on Si. A strategy si for player i is extensive form rationalizable if si E lln>o Sf. 
The preceding definition is very similar to that originally proposed by Pearce 
[15]. We deviate from this author in that, at each step n, we require that a candi­
date strategy Si for player i be an unconstrained best reply at every h E 'Hi(si) to 
an appropriate conjecture; Pearce only requires that the sequential optimality of 
Si be checked against strategies in sr-l which agree with Si at all information sets 
which do not (weakly) follow h. However, this difference is immaterial (see Batti­
galli [7]). A major departure from Pearce's definition is that players' conditional 
beliefs need not be derived from product priors. Therefore the two definitions are 
equivaleIJ.t only for two-person games and perfect information games (for more on 
this see [5] and [7]). 
Before we move on to the main section of the paper, let us verify that the 
iterative deletion procedure just defined singles out the profile ((In, T), L) in the 
Battle of the Sexes with an outside option and the backward induction outcome 
in the "Centipede." In the first game we have sp = { (In, T), (In, B), (Out, 
*)} (the choice after Out is clearly irrelevant as far as weak sequential rationality 
is concerned) and sg = {L,R}. Since (In, B) is strictly dominated, we have 
Sf = { (In, T), (Out,*)}, while Si = sg. For n = 2, since the only strategy 
profiles in S1 which reach the simultaneous-moves subgame are those in which 
Player 1 plays In and follows with T, Si = {L}; Si = Sf. But for n = 3 we 
finally get Sr = { (In, T)}, and of course sg = Si: we have identified the forward 
induction solution. In the "Centipede" game extensive form rationalizability is 
closely related to the backward induction procedure: step 1 eliminates (a,a), step 
2 eliminates (A,A), step 3 eliminates (a,d) and, finally, step 4 eliminates (A,D). 
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4. 2. Epistemic Characterization 
In our epistemic model, the set of states of the world is S x T = IIiEI Six IIiEI Ji. 
An event is a measurable subset EC S x T .  Et;, C S  x T_i is event E from the 
point of view of type ti , that is, 
� is the event "player i is rational" , that is, 
R = niEJ � is the event "everyone is rational." 
The following definition introduces the first key ingredient in our axiomati­
zation. We formalize the idea that a player may formulate a conjecture on her 
opponents' strategies and types, and may be unwilling to revise it unless, in the 
course of the game, she receives information which falsifies it. 
Definition 4.3. For any event E and type ti E Ti we say that type ti strongly 
believes E (believes E whenever possible) if for all information sets h E Hi, 
Let 13;(E) denote the event that player i strongly believes E and let /3*(E) 
denote the event that everybody strongly believes E, that is: 
• f3;(E) := {(s, t): \:/h E Hi, Et, n (S(h) x T_i) '# 0=}9i,h(ti)(Et.)= 1} , 
• /3*(E) := niEI f3;(E). 
By inspecting the definition of strong belief, one notices that the event E itself 
determines the class of information sets h E Hi where Player i's conjectures are 
restricted. Alternative belief operators (see the next subsection, or Battigalli [6]) 
restrict players' beliefs on a ji:I;ed family of information sets. 
This simple observation has two important consequences. First, for arbitrary 
events E and F, we have 13;(E n F) 2 /3T(E) n /3T(F), but equality need not 
hold. Clearly, every state of the world in /3T(E) n /3T(F) is such that Player 
i's belief at any information set h E Hi consistent with En F (i.e. such that 
(En F)t;, n (S(h) x T_i) '# 0) assigns probability one to both E and F, hence 
to En F: thus, every such state is also an element of /3T(E n F). However, the 
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converse need not be true, because there might be an information set h E Hi 
which is inconsistent with F but consistent with E (or vice versa): in this case, 
f3;(E n F) places no restrictions on Player i's beliefs at any such h, but clearly 
(3; ( E) n (3; ( F) does. Thus, a given state of the world may be an element of the 
former set, but not of the latter. As a result, one must be careful to interpret 
axioms involving conjunctions of strong belief operators accurately. 
Second, note that the argument above implies that, unlike standard epistemic 
operators, the strong belief operator f3; is not monotone (otherwise the inclusion 
relation (3;(E n F) 2 (3;(E) n f3X(F) would necessarily hold as an equality). 
The second ingredient in our axiomatization is the best rationalization princi­
ple. The idea (which will be made explicit in Remark 1 below) is that, at each 
point in the game, players bestow the highest possible degree of strategic sophis­
tication upon their opponents. That is, every player strongly believes that her 
opponents are rational, and she strongly believes that they, too, strongly believe 
that their opponents are rational, etc.. Thus, if in the course of the game she 
receives information which contradicts the latter statement, but not the former, 
she continues to be certain that the former statement is true. 
These observations motivate the next few definitions. For any event E, let 
1(E) =En (3*(E) 
denote the set of states where E is true and everybody strongly believes E. Note 
that 1(E) is measurable; also, by construction, it is monotone. Since operator 
/ preserves measurability, we can define iterations of I in the usual way. In 
particular we obtain the following identities: 
1°(E) = E, 
11(E) =En (3*(E), 
12(E) =I [En (3*(E)] =En (3*(E) n (3* [En (3*(E)]) 
It should be clear that the iterated. application of the operator / yields a 
sequence of events which represent the restrictions discussed above and in the 
introduction. We can actually be even more explicit: 
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Remark 1. By inspection of the definitions above 
Therefore (s, t) E "t(R) if and only if, for each player i, si, E Pi(ti) and ti 
strongly believes_"'/(R) for all k = 0, ... , n - 1. 
Having disposed of all the preliminaries, we are ready to state our main result: 
Proposition 4.4. For every strategy profiles E S the following statements bold: 
(a) for all n 2: 0' 8 E sn+ 1 if and only if there exists a P!'ofile of infinite hierarchies 
of conditional beliefs t ET such that (s, t) E "t(R); 
(b) s E n�=O 3n if and only if there exists a profile of infinite hierarchies of beliefs 
t ET such that (s, t) E n�=oln(R). 
More concisely, we can say that, for every n 2: 0, sn+l is the projection on S 
of the event 1n(R); a similar statement holds as n-+ oo. 
Battigalli [7] shows that, in generic finite games of perfect information, exten­
sive form rationalizability is outcome equivalent to backward induction. Therefore 
we obtain the following corollary. 
Corollary 4.5. Suppose that the given game bas perfect information and there 
are no ties between payoffs at different terminal nodes. Then for every state 
(s, t) E n�o rn(R), the path induced bys coincides with the (unique) backward 
induction path. 
We emphasize that the sufficient conditions stated in Corollary 4.5 are explicit 
and transparent assumptions about players' dispositions to act ((s, t) E R) and 
to form and revise their beliefs when faced with either expected or unexpected 
evidence ((s, t) E n�=l rn(R)). Furthermore, our assumptions do not imply that 
a player at a non rationalizable node would play and/ or expect the backward 
induction continuation. In fact, there are games where this is inconsistent with 
strong belief in rationality (cf., for example, the game depicted in Figure 3 of [17] 
and the discussion therein) . 
I 
Finally, it should be noted Tan and Werlang's characterization of correlated 
rationalizability (iterated strict dominance) in normal-form games ([23], Theorem 
5.3) may be viewed as a special case of our Proposition 4.4. 
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In such games, players' conjectures are adequately represented by (single) 
probability measures, which can be seen as (degenerate) conditional probabil­
ity systems in which the only conditioning event is the empty history. In such 
circumstances, strong belief is easily seen to reduce to probability one belief - a 
monotone epistemic operator. 
As a consequence, on one hand our · axioms specialize to those proposed by 
Tan and Werlang; on the other, extensive-form rationalizability coincides with 
iterated strict dominance in simultaneous games. The characterization result now 
follows immediately from Proposition 4.4. 
4.3. Rationalizability and Conditional Common Certainty of Rational-
ity 
. 
Let us now restrict our attention to the class of multistage games with observable 
actions. In this case 'Hi = 'H, i E I, where 1{ is the set of partial (or non terminal) 
histories. Each h E 1i represents a common observation and, for any event E, it 
makes sense to define the event "there would be common certainty of E at h." 
Formally, 
is the event "i would be certain of E at h." This is of course a "standard", 
monotone belief operator. Let 
f3h(E) = n f3i,h(E), iEJ 
and, for all n � 0, 
Then event "there would be common certainty of E at h" is 
cf3h(E) = n (f3ht(E). 
n>O 
We can then state a simple relationship between extensive form rationaliz­
ability and common certainty of rationality. Say that partial history h is con­
sistent with rationality and common certainty of rationality if (Rn cf3h(R)) n -
(S(h) x T) #- 0. 
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Proposition 4.6. For evezy multistage game with observable actions, if partial 
history h E 1{ is induced by some profile of extensive form rationalizable strategies 
(i.e. S00 n S(h) =F 0) then his consistent with rationality-and common certainty 
of rationality. 
Note that the proposition provides only a su,fficient condition. There are games 
with histories consistent with common certainty of rationality and yet unreachable 
by profiles of extensive form rationalizable strategies. The following example 
illustrates this point.11 
2 a A 
3,0 6,1 1,0 o,o 
Consider the following epistemic model (probabilities which are not relevant 
to the argument are omitted for simplicity): 
1 
2 
3 
Pair 
((D,*), tn) 
((A,A), t21) 
((A,D)), t31) 
P1 (0) 
0,1,0 
i,i,O 1 1 1 
2,6,3 
P1(Aa) 
0,1,0 
0 1 2 ,3, 3 
1 
2 
3 
Pair 
((d,*), t12) 
((a,a), t22) 
((a,d), t32) 
0,0,1 
0,1,0 0,1,0 
It is easy to see that extensive-form rationalizability requires Player 1 to choose 
D at her first node (if Player 2's first node were reached, then the game would be 
expected to continue with a, A and a). Thus, Player l's second node (following 
the history Aa) cannot be reached. 
Yet, in state (2,2) there is common certainty of rationality at Player l 's second 
node, as is apparent from the conditional probabilities p1(Aa) and p2(Aa). 
To verify directly that state (2,2) is indeed inconsistent with our axioms, no­
tice first that our axioms eliminate all states (i, 3) because (a,d) is (sequentially) 
irrational for Player 2, regardless of his conjecture. Then, in successive iterations, 
this leads to the elimination of states involving types t3i, t12, and finally t21. 
11 Reny (16] provides a similar example, although his discussion does not employ a formal 
epistemic model. 
20 
5. Conclusions
We have provided an epistemic characterization of extensive-form rationalizability 
which highlights its relationship with common certainty of rationality and forward­
induction reasoning. As a by-product, we have also obtained sufficient condjtions 
for the backward induction outcome to 'obtain in generic N-person games with 
perfect information. 
Although our analysis is restricted to finite games with complete information, 
its extensions to a more general class of games is quite straightforward. Batti­
galli [6] already provides an epistemic analysis of dynamic games of incomplete 
information. Our construction of the universal, extensive form type space can 
be carried out under fairly general assumptions (i.e. Si Polish and ?-li count­
able, i E J). Given this, we conjecture that our main result can be proved under
standard compactness-continuity assumptions. 
According to the notion of rationalizability discussed here, a player may have 
correlated beliefs about his opponents. While this is perfectly consistent with a
noncooperative approach (e.g. Stalnaker [21] and [22]), it is nonetheless interesting 
to formulate an appropriate stochastic independence property within our exten­
sive form epistemic model and to combine it with other epistemic assumptions. 
We could thus provide epistemic characterizations of solution concepts featuring 
forward induction and independent beliefs, like those put forward by Reny [17] 
and Battigalli [5]. 
Another natural direction for further research is to examine equilibrium con­
cepts which incorporate notions of forward induction, such as Cho and Kreps's 
[11] well-:known "intuitive criterion". 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 4.4 
We need the following preliminary result: 
Lemma 5.1. Fix, for every j =f. i, a collection {tj(sj)}sjESj of types in Ti . Also,
fix a CPS 8i E Ll7"ii(S). Then there exists a unique ti E Ti such that, 'for each
h E 'Hi, fli,h(ti) has finite support and 
Proof. We follow [20], proof of Lemma 7, with the required adjustments. 
Define a candidate CPS µi E Ll'Hi(S x T-i) by setting 
for every h E 'Hi, and extending the assignments by additivity. Axioms 1 and 2 
follow immediately from the observation that the maps Sj t-t tj(sj) collectively 
yield an embedding of UhE'Hi supp [8i(.IS(h))] (a finite set) in S x T_i, so that, forevery h E 'Hi, µi(.IS(h) x T_i) is indeed a probability measure on S X T-i ·  By the
same argument, µi must also satisfy Axiom 3, i.e. it must be a CPS; of course, 
each µi(. IS(h) X T-i) has finite support by construction. Now invoke the fact that
gi is a homeomorphism to obtain the required type ti .  • 
We are now ready to prove the main result. 12 
Part (a) of the proposition is implied by the following statement:
For all k � 0,
(al) there are 2IJI functions 8: : Si ---t Ll'Hi(S) and tf : Si ---t Ti, i E J, such 
that, for all s E S  and i E J, 8:(si) = 8i(tf(si))13 and
• if k � 1 ,  for all m = 0, . . .  , k - l , if s E Sm\sm+l then or(si) = 8:(si),
tf (Si) = tf (Si),
12For alternative proofs of similar results see (6] and (20] . 
13Recall that o, (t,) is the first order CPS of epistemic type t, . 
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• for all h E 1-ti(si), all m = 0, . . .  , k, if smnS(h) =/ 0 then 8�(si)(Sm lS(h)) = 
1,  
• if  s E Sk+l then 
( 
s ,  (tf(si)iEI) E "·/(R); 
{a2) for all states (s , t), if (s , t) E '"•/(R) then s E Sk+1 . 
(k = 0), (al .tJ). For each i, fix arbitrary functions o;: Si -t '6,1ii(S), ·ti :  Si -t 
Ti such. that, for all si , o;(si) = 8i(ti(si)) (this is possible by Lemma 5.1). Let 
(o?(·), t?(·)) coincide with (o;(-), ti(·)) on Si\Sf .  For each i EI, and each si E Sf , 
let o?(si) be a first order CPS rationalizing Si, i.e. Di E ri1(si)· Then we can use 
Lemma 5.1 to define ti = t?(si) as the (unique) ti satisfying: 
'ifs' Es, 9i,h(ti) ((s' , (tj(sj))#i)) = o?(si)(s'IS(h)). 
By construction, b?(si) = 8i(t?(si)) and Si =  Pi(ti)· Thus, for all s E S1, (s, (tf'(si)iEJ) E 
R = 1°(R). The other statements in (al) hold trivially. 
(a2. 0) .  Suppose that (s , t) ER = 1°(R). Then, for each i EI, si is a weakly 
sequentii:il best response to 8i(ti) and thus s E 81 . · 
(k = n) . Suppose that the statement above holds for all k = 0, 1, .. . , n - 1. 
(al .n) .  For each i E I and each si E Si\Sf+1, let c5�(si) = c5�-1(si) and 
tf(si) = tf-1(si)· Clearly the first claim in (al) holds for the functions �(·) and 
ti(·) , independently of how we complete their specification on sr+1 . 
Let s E sn+i . For each i EI , define �(si) and tf (si) as follows. Take a first 
order belief c5f satisfying the conditions of Definition 3.2 with respect to si , that 
is, c5f E r;1(si) and for all h E 1-ti(si), if S(h) n sn =I 0 then 8f(Sn jS(h)) = 1. 
Now define �(si) E ('6.(S)]1ii as follows: for all h E 'Hi and all s' E S, 
81:( · ) (  'IS(h)) = { �(s'IS(h)) , if h E 1-ti(si) and sn n S(h) =1 0  i 8i 8 0?-1(si)(s' jS(h)) , otherwise · 
It can be easily checked that �(si) is a CPS, i.e. 8f(si) E '6,1ii(S). Furthermore 
si = ri(c5f(si)). To see this, note that the inductive hypothesis implies si = 
Pi(tf-1(si)). Since �(si) is a CPS given by a combination of � and c5f-1(si) = 
Di ( tf-1 ( si)) the weak sequential rationality property is satisfied by construction. 
By Lemma 5.1 we can choose ti = tf(si) as the (unique) type ti satisfying: 
'ifs' ES, 9i,h(ti) ((s' , (tT1(sj))#i)) = �(si)(s' jS(h)). 
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By construction, si = Pi(tf(si)). 
The second claim of (al) is also easily proved for k = n. Suppose that h E 
'Hi(si) and sn n S(h) -:f 0 .  Since the sequence {Sm}m;:::o is weakly decreasing, it 
is also the case that for all m = 0 ,  ... , n - 1 ,  sm n S(h) -:f 0 anc;l by construction 
Now suppose that, for some m = 0, ... , n - 1 ,  sm n S(h) -:f 0 and sn n S(h) = 0 .  
Then the construction of 8�(si) and the inductive hypothesis yield 
In order to prove that (s, (tf(si)iEI) E ''t(R) it is enough to show that for all 
k = 0, ... , n - 1 ,  i E I  and h E 'Hi, if ti = tf(si) and [lk (R)]t. n (S(h) x T-i) -:f 0 
then 9i,h(ti) ( [1k(R)]ti) = 1 (see Remark 1) . Thus fix k E {O, . .. , n - 1 }, i and 
h E 'Hi; let ti satisfy the foregoing assumption. First note that this implies that 
h E 'Hi(si)· In fact [!k (R)k C [�]t. ;  since Si =  Pi(ti), [�]ti =  {(s' , t'_i) : s� = 
SiPi(ti)}. By assumption, [�k n (S(h) x T_i) -:f 0 .  Thus there is some s'_i 
such that (si, s'_i) E S(h); that is, h E 'Hi(si)· By the inductive hypothesis Sk+l 
is the projection of --yk (R) on S. Thus, [1k (R))t. n (S(h) x TI#iTj) -:f 0 implies 
Sk+1 n S(h) -:f 0 .  We have just proved that in this case 8f(si)(Sk+1 JS(h)) = 1 .  
Furthermore the inductive hypothesis implies that 
'Vm E {k ,  .. .  , n - 2}, 'Vs' E sm+i\sm+2 , 
and 
Therefore 
'Vs' E Sk+1 , (s', (tj-1(sj))jEI) E /k (R) . 
These facts and the definition of 9i,h (ti) = 9i,h (ti (Si)) yield 
= L 8�(s' JS(h)) = 1 
s'ESk+l 
as desired. 
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( a2.n) .  Suppose that (s ,  t) E "'t(R). Since "'t(R) C ')'n-1(R), the inductive 
hypothesis implies that s E sn. For each i, let bf = bi (ti) be the first order 
conditional beliefs of type ti . Since !'n(R) C R, Si is a weakly sequential best 
response to bf. In order to prove that Si E sr+ 1 it is suffi.cier:it to check that b� 
satisfies condition 1 of Definition 3.2. Consider an information set h E 'Hi (si) 
such that sn n S(h) =f= 0. By the inductive hypothesis sn is the projection on S 
of l'n-l ( R). Therefore 
,,n-1(R) n (S(h) x II Tj) =I= 0. 
jEI 
Since (s, (t1)JEI) E f'n(R) C ')'n-l(R), this implies 
[!'n-1(R)]t. n (S(h) x II T1) =I= 0. 
#i 
Since ti strongly believes [!'n-l(R)] , it follows that 
Taking again into account that 5n is the projection of f'n-i (R) and that bf = bi (ti) 
we obtain 8f (Sn lS(h)) = 1 as desired. This concludes the proof of part (a). 
Part (b) is more straightforward. Note first that rln>ol'n(R) is nonempty (this 
is not trivial because Ti is uncountable) .  The key ob�rvation is that the set of 
all. probability measures on a compact Polish space is also compact and Polish. 
In our simple setting, S is trivially compact, so applying this fact iteratively, 
using Tychonoff's theorem and noticing that each Ti is a closed subset of Hi , one 
readily sees that Ti is compact. Hence, since the nonempty closed sets ·1n(R) form 
a family with the finite intersection property (because they are nested) , they have 
a nonempty infinite intersection. 
Now suppose (s , t) E rln>o !'n(R). Since, by part (a) , each 5n+l is the projec­
tion on S of l'n(R), we conclude that s E 5n+l for every n, so s E rln>o sn (recall 
S0 = S). -
Finally, let N be the smallest integer such that 5N = nn>O 5n (which must 
exist because S is finite) . Pick any s E SN and consider the sequence of sets 
M(m, s) = l'N-l+m(R) n ({s} x T) .  By part (a) , each set M(m, s) is nonempty 
and closed; also, the sequence of sets M ( m, s) is decreasing, and hence has the 
finite intersection property. Then any strategy-type profile in nmco M(m, s) =f= 0 
has the required properties. • 
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Proof of Proposition 4.6 
The proof of Proposition 4.6 relies on the following lemmata. For any event E let 
100(E) = nn20 /n (E) . 
Lemma 5.2. For every event E, 1(!00(E)) = /00(E) . 
Proof. By definition, for every event F, 1(F) = F n /3* (F) C F. Thus 
we only have to show that 100(E) C 1(!00(E)) .  Suppose that (s ,  t) E /00(E) . 
We must prove that, for all players i, (s, t) E /3X (!00 (E)) ,  that is, each ti in t 
strongly believes 100(E) . Fix i and h E 1-li arbitrarily. Assume that [!00(E)].ti n 
(S(h) X T)  =/= 0. Since for all n, [100(E)]ti C [!n(E)]t, ,  it follows that 
[/n(E)]ti n (S(h) x T) =/= 0. (5.1) 
Since (s, t) E 100(E) C 1n+1 (E) , ti strongly believes /n(E) and thus 5.1 implies 
(5.2) 
As { 1n(E)} n>o is a decreasing sequence of events converging to 100(E) and the probability measure 9i,h (ti) is continuous 
Therefore ti strongly believes /00 ( E) . • 
Lemma 5.3. For every multistage game with observed actions, every partial his­
tory h E 1-l and every event E, 
100 (E) n (S(h) x T)  c n (/3ht(E) . 
n20 
Proof. It is true by definition that 100 (E) n (S(h) x T )  c E = (/3h)0(E) . As­
sume that 100(E) n (S(h) x T) c (/3hr(E) .  Consider any state (s , t) E 100(E) n 
(S(h) x T). We must show that, for all i, 9i,h (ti) ( [(/3hr(E)J4) = 1 .  By assump­
tion 
[/00(E)lt_ n (S(h) x T) =/= 0 .  
By Lemma 5.2 (s , t) E / [/00 (E)] .  It follows that 
9i,h (ti) (b00 (E)Jt.) = 1 . 
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By the inductive hypothesis 
Therefore 
• 
Proof of Proposition 4.6. Suppose that 800 n S(h) # 0. By Proposition 4.4 
there is some state (s , t) E 100{R) n (S(h) x T).  Then Lemma 5.3 implies that 
(s , t) E n (f3h )n(R) = R n c{3h (R) . 
n;:::o 
• 
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